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Abstract— Emotions and feelings (i.e. affects) are a central fea-
ture of human behavior. Due to complexity and interdisciplinarity
of affective phenomena, attempts to define them have often been
unsatisfactory. This article provides a simple logical structure, in
which affective concepts can be defined. The set of affects defined
is similar to the set of emotions covered in the OCC model [1],
but the model presented in this article is fully computationally
defined, whereas the OCC model depends on undefined concepts.
Following Matthis [2], affects are seen as unconscious, emo-
tions as preconscious and feelings as conscious. Affects are thus a
superclass of emotions and feelings with regards to consciousness.
A set of affective states and related affect-specific behaviors and
strategies can be defined with unconscious affects only.
In addition, affects are defined as processes of change in the
body state, that have specific triggers. For example, an affect of
hope is defined as a specific body state that is triggered when the
agent is becomes informed about a future event, that is positive
with regards to the agent’s needs.
Affects are differentiated from each other by types of causing
events. Affects caused by unexpected positive, neutral and neg-
ative events are delight, surprise and fright, respectively. Affects
caused by expected positive and negative future events are hope
and fear.
Affects caused by expected past events are as follows: satisfac-
tion results from a positive expectation being fulfilled, disappoint-
ment results from a positive expectation not being fulfilled, fears-
confirmed results from a negative expectation being fulfilled, and
relief results from a negative expectation not being fulfilled. Pride
is targeted towards a self-originated positive event, and shame
towards a self-originated negative event. Remorse is targeted
towards a self-originated action causing a negative event. Pity is
targeted towards a liked agent experiencing a negative event, and
happy-for towards a liked agent experiencing a positive event.
Resentment is targeted towards a disliked agent experiencing a
positive event, and gloating towards a disliked agent experiencing
a negative event. An agent is liked/loved if it has produced a net
utility greater than zero, and disliked/hated if the net utility is
lower than zero. An agent is desired if it is expected to produce
a positive net utility in the future, and disliked if the expected
net utility is negative.
The above model for unconscious affects is easily computa-
tionally implementable, and may be used as a starting point in
building believable simulation models of human behavior. The
models can be used as a starting point in the development of
computational psychological, psychiatric, sociological and crimi-
nological theories, or in e.g. computer games.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN this article, computationally trivial differentiation cri-teria for the most common affects for simple agents are
presented (for introduction to the agent-based approach see
e.g. [3]). The focus is in providing a simple logical or
computational structure, in which affective concepts can be
defined.
Manuscript received January 31, 2008; revised March 15, 2008.
The set of affects defined is similar to the set of emotions
presented in the OCC model [1], which has been a popular
emotion model in computer science. However, as e.g. Petta
points out, it is only partially computationally defined [4]. For
example, definitions of many emotions are based on concepts
of standards and norms, but these concepts are undefined.
These limitations have often not been taken into account.
The OCC model may be closer to a requirements specifica-
tion than to a directly implementable model. Ortony himself
has later described the model as too complicated and proposed
a simpler model [5], which may however be somewhat limited.
The missing concepts are however definable. In this article,
the necessary definitions and a restructured model similar to
the OCC model are presented. A simple implementation of
the structural classification model is also presented.
The primary concept is the concept of a computational
agent, that represents the affective subject. An agent is defined
as possessing a predefined set of goals, e.g. self-survival
and reproduction. These goals form the basis of subjectively
experienced utility. An event fulfilling a goal has a positive
utility; correspondingly, an event reducing the fulfillment of
a goal has a negative utility. All other goals may be seen
as subgoals derived from these primary, evolutionarily formed
goals. Utility is thus seen as a measure of evolutionary fitness.
An agent is defined as logically consisting of a controlling
part (nervous system) and a controlled part (the rest of
the body). To be able to control its environment (through
controlling its own body, that performs actions, that affect the
environment) the agent forms a model of the environment.
This object model consists of representations of previously
perceived objects associated with the utilities they have pro-
duced. All future predictions are thus based solely on past
experiences.
An affect is defined as a process, in which the controlling
part, on perceiving an utility-changing event in the context
of its current object representations (object model), produces
a corresponding evolutionarily determined bodily change, i.e.
transfers the agent to another body state.
Specific behaviors and strategies can be associated with
specific affective states. The set of possible affective states and
associated actions may be predefined (i.e. innate) or learned.
Innate associations may include e.g. aggression towards the
causing object of a frustrating event (i.e. aggression as an
action associated with frustrated state). Learned actions are
acquired by associating previously experienced states with the
results of experimented actions in these states.
Emotions and feelings are defined as subclasses of affects
[2]. Emotions are defined as preconscious affects and feel-
ings as conscious affects. Being conscious of some object is
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preliminarily defined as the object being a target of attention
(see e.g. [6]). Correspondingly, being preconscious is being
capable of attending to the object when needed. In contrast,
unconscious affects are processes that cannot be perceived at
all due to lack of sensory mechanisms, or otherwise cannot
be attended to, due to e.g. limitations or mechanisms of the
controlling part.
Thus, emotions and feelings are conceptualized as requiring
the agent to be capable of being conscious of changes in its
body states [7]. As an affect was defined as a physiological
state change triggered by a perception of a predefined event
or an object constellation, we can also define a system where
agents are not conscious of their affects, but still have them.
These unconscious affects suffice to produce a set of states, to
which affect-specific behaviors and strategies may be bound.
In effect, such agents are affective but not emotional.
Relations between the concepts of affect, emotion, feeling
and consciousness were defined above. Another question is the
differentiation of affects from each other. This is achieved by
classifying the triggering object constellations. The constella-
tions include the state of the agent, which in turn includes the
complete history of the agent. In other words the idea is the
following: affects are differentiated from each other by both
the event type and the contents of the current object model,
i.e. by the structure of the subjective social situation. This
subjective social situation is formed by agent’s life history,
i.e. the series of all perceived events.
To preliminarily bind this conceptual framework to psycho-
analytic object relations theory (e.g. [8], [9]), we note that
objects and their utilities in relation to self form a network of
object relations.
II. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
A. Ontological definitions
Let us assume a world that produces a series of events.
The world contains objects, some of which are alive. Living
objects that are able to act on the world are called agents.
Agents’ actions are a subset of events. An event consists of a
type indicator and references to causing object(s) and a target
object(s).
B. An agent as a control system
An agent is seen as a control system, which consists of
two parts: a controlled system and a controlling system (in
computer science, this idea has been presented by at least
[10]). This division can be done on a functional or logical level
only. Let us thus define, that an agent’s controlling system is
the brain and the associated neural system, and the controlled
system is the body. Physically the controlling system is part
of the controlled system, but on a functional level they are
separate, although there may be feedback loops, so that the
actions of the controlling system change its own physical basis,
which in turn results in modifications in the rules of control.
An agent usually experiences only a part of the series of
events in the world; that part is the environment of the agent.
Experiencing happens through perceptions that contain events.
These events are evaluated with regards to target agent’s needs.
The value of an event for an agent’s needs can be called its
utility (the utility concept used here is similar to the utility
concept used in reinforcement learning [11]). The utility of an
event or action is associated with the causing object.
In a simplified model, fixed utilities can be assigned to event
types. In this case the evaluation phase is omitted.
The basis of utilities represented in the controlling system
(i.e. mind) are the needs of the controlled system (i.e. body).
Utilities direct actions to attempt the fulfillment of the needs
of the body. Utility is thus to be understood as a measure of
change in evolutionary fitness caused by an event. An agent
attempts to experience as much value as possible (maximize
its utility) during the rest of its lifetime. Maximizing utility
maximizes evolutionary fitness, i.e. self-survival and repro-
duction, according to an utility function preset by evolution of
the species in question.
In order to attempt this utility maximization, the agent has
to be able to affect the environment (to act), so that it can
pursue highly valued events and try to avoid less valued events.
It also has to be able to predict which actions would lead
it to experience highly valued events and avoid low-valued
(meaningless or harmful) experiences. To be able to predict,
the agent has to have a model of the environment, which
contains models of perceived objects associated with their
utilities.
As the agent can never know if it has seen all possible
objects and event types of the world, all information is neces-
sarily uncertain, i.e. probability-based in its nature. Therefore,
when an agent performs an action, it expects a certain utility.
The actual resulting utility may differ from expected, due to
the necessarily limited predictive capability of the internal
model of the environment.
At any moment, an agent selects and performs the action
with the highest expected utility. Thus, every action maximizes
subjective utility. Also, any goal is derived from the primary
goals (needs), i.e. self-survival and reproduction.
Lifetime utility means the sum of all value inputs that the
agent experiences during its lifetime. Past utility means the
sum of already experienced value inputs. Future utility means
the sum of value inputs to be experienced during the rest of the
lifetime. Since this is unknown, it can only be estimated based
on past utility. This estimate is called expected future utility.
Then expected lifetime utility is the sum of past utility and
expected future utility. An agent maximizes expected future
utility. If it would maximize expected lifetime utility, it would
die when the expected future utility falls below zero.
C. Temperament and personality
Personality is the consequences of learned differences ex-
pressed in behavior. Thus, personality is determined by the
learned contents of the controlling system. Temperament is
the consequences of physiological differences expressed in
behavior.
D. Norms and motivation
Norms are defined as learned utilities of actions, i.e. ex-
pected utilities of action. Fundamentally, norms are based
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on physiological needs, as this is the only way to bootstrap
(get starting values for) the values of actions. Utilities can be
learned from feedback from agent’s own body only. However,
the utilities determined by internal rewards may be modified
by social interaction: an action with a high internal rewards
may cause harm to other agents, who then threat or harm the
agent, lowering the utility of the action to take into account the
needs of the other agents. Thus, norms of an individual usually
partly express utilities of other agents. In a simplified model
there is no need to represent the two components separately.
They may however be separated when modeling of internal
motivational conflicts is required.
A standard is defined as a synonym for norm, though as a
term it has a more personal connotation, i.e. internal rewards
may dominate over the external rewards. Motivation equals
the expected utility of an action. Motivation and norm are
thus synonymous.
E. The processing loop
The processing loop of the agent is the following: perceive
new events, determine their utilities, update object model,
perform the action maximizing utility in the current situation.
As a new event is perceived, the representation of the causing
object is updated to include the utility of the current event.
The object representation currently being retrieved and
updated is defined as being the target of attention. After
evaluating all new objects, the object with the highest absolute
utility (of all objects in the model) is taken as a target of
attention.
F. Object contexts
If an agent’s expected future utility, which it attempts to
maximize, is calculated as a sum of utilities of all known
objects, it can change only when new events are perceived.
However, if it is calculated from conscious objects only, or tak-
ing the conscious objects as a starting node and expanding the
context from there, keeping low-valued objects unconscious
becomes motivated. Now e.g. the idea of repression becomes
definable.
Thus, introduction of an internal object context enables
internal dynamics of the expected future utility. Two kinds of
dynamics emerge: first related to new objects, and second re-
lated to context switches, which happen during the processing
of new events.
It can also be defined, that agents can expand the con-
text. This expansion is conceptualized as an action, which
is selected according to the same principle as other actions,
i.e. when it is expected to maximize future utility. This may
happen e.g. during idle times, i.e. when there are no new events
and all pending actions have been performed, or when several
actions cannot be prioritized over each other. Expansion or
contraction of the context causes context switches and thus
potentially changes in expected future utility.
An especially interesting consequence is that the idea of
context expansion during idle times leads to the amount of
stress being related to the size of the context (an ”emergent”
feature). When the agent is overloaded, it context expansion
may not take first priority. It ”does not have time” to expand
the context, i.e. think things thoroughly. Therefore, conscious-
ness of objects’ features diminishes; consciousness ”becomes
shallow”. This shallowness includes all object representations,
also the self-representation.
Overloading has also another consequence. New percepts
must be evaluated and appropriate actions selected, but there
may be no time to perform these actions, which are then
queued. The priorities of the queued actions may change when
new events are evaluated. Therefore, at each time point a
different action has first priority. Actions taking more time
than one time unit are started but not finished, since at the next
time point some other action is more important. Therefore, the
agent perceives that it is ”too busy to do anything”, a common
feature of burnout.
In practice, expansion is done by traversing the object
network from the currently prioritized object towards higher
utility. For example, an agent has perceived a threatening
object and thus expects a negative event in the near future.
It targets an affect of fear towards the object. As a result its
body state changes to ”fear” state.
One way of conceptualizing action selection would be to
think that a list of actions is browsed to see if there is an
action that would cancel the threat. Another way is to think of
the action as a node in the object network. Taking the feared
object as a starting point, the network is traversed to find a
suitable action represented by a node linked with the feared
object, the link representing the expected utility of the node.
If the node is has the highest utility of all the nodes starting
from this object, it is traversed to. If the node is an action, it
is performed. It it is another object, the expansion continues.
As the expected future utility is calculated from the objects
in the context, the threat is cancelled when an action with
a high enough utility is found, although it may not yet be
performed (the utility should be weighted by the probability
of succeeding in performing the action). This in effect corre-
sponds to a discounting of expected utility.
Another, probably better, option would be to take the
affective state as a starting node. If the agent has previously
experienced a state of fear, it has a representation of this state
(an object), and actions associated with the state.
Personality was previously defined as the learned contents
of the controlling part of the control system. Personality is
therefore formed by adding new objects and their associated
utilities to the object network. In the psychoanalytic tradition
this is called internalization [9].
The continuing process of internalizing new, more satisfying
functions of the self may be called progression. In progression,
an agent’s focus shifts on the new objects, since the old objects
turn out less satisfying in comparison. Correspondingly, if the
new functions later turn out to be useless and better ones
cannot be found, the agent turns back to the old objects; this
may be called regression.
III. AFFECTS, EMOTIONS AND FEELINGS
A. Affect as a bodily process
Affects are defined here as predefined bodily processes that
have certain triggers. When a specific trigger is perceived, a
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Fig. 1. Relations between event-related concepts.
corresponding change in body state follows.
This change may then be perceived or not. If it is per-
ceived, the content of perception is the process of change.
In other words, an affect is perceived when the content of the
perception is a representation of the body state in transition,
associated with the perception of the trigger. This is essentially
the idea of Damasio [7].
The triggers are not simple objects, but specific constel-
lations of object relations. A certain constellation triggers a
certain emotion. For example, fear is triggered when a negative
event is expected to happen in the future. There is thus an
object relation between the agent and the feared object, in
which the object has a negative expected utility. This relation
may be seen as an object constellation. In principle the current
affect is determined by the whole history of interactions
between the agent and the objects, not just the current event,
since if e.g. the expected utility was very high in the beginning,
a small negative change would not suffice to change the object
relation from hope to fear. Alternatively, if an agent knows
how to avoid the threat (has an appropriate action), then fear
is removed when a representation of the suitable action is
retrieved from memory. In such case the agent was expecting
to be able to cancel the effects of the expected negative event,
and expected utility rises back to a level corresponding to the
sum of utilities of the event and the reparative action.
These differences are however related to triggers only. What
makes an experience of fear different from an experience of
e.g. hope are the perceived differences in bodily reactions
associated with these emotions, i.e. a representation of body
state associated with one emotion is different from the rep-
resentation of a representation of another emotion. This is
essentially the ’qualia’ problem, which in this context would
be equal to asking why e.g. fear feels like fear, or what gives
fear the quality of fearness. The solution is that the ’quality’ of
feeling of e.g. fear is just the specific, unique representation of
the body state. There cannot be any additional aspects in the
experience; what is experienced (i.e. the target of attention) is
simply the representation.
B. Differentiating by levels of consciousness
Relations between affects, emotions and feelings are defined
according to Matthis, who defines affects as a superclass of
emotions and feelings [2]. Differentiation is made with respect
to levels of consciousness. Emotions are preconscious affects,
whereas feelings are conscious affects. There may also be
affects that cannot be preconscious or conscious (i.e. cannot
be perceived); these are labeled unconscious.
Now we seem to face the problem of defining conscious-
ness. However, the agent only has to be conscious of some
objects. E.g. Baars has suggested, that being conscious of an
object corresponds to that object being the target of attention
[6]. Let us thus define that conscious contents are the contents
that are the target of attention at a given moment. Correspond-
ingly, preconscious are the contents that can be taken at the
target of attention, if they become the most important at a
given moment.
When an object is perceived (as a part of an event), an
agent searches its internal object model to see if the object
is known or unknown. It then attempts to estimate the utility
of the event (good or useful, meaningless, bad or harmful)
by using the known utility of the object. The internal model
of this object is then updated with the utility of the current
event. If there is no need to search and no unchecked objects
are present, attention is targeted towards the object or action
which has the highest absolute value of expected utility. The
idea behind this is that utility is maximized by pursuing the
highest positive opportunity or dodging the worst threat. If
only one goal is present, a higher positive event cancels out a
lesser negative event. Multiple goals create more complicated
situations, which are not discussed in this article.
C. Multilayered controlling systems
For body states in transition and in association with a
perceived triggering object constellation to be taken as targets
of attention, the controlling system needs an ability to inspect
its own structural configurations and their changes in time.
Therefore an another layer is needed, that records the states of
a lower layer of the controlling system. These records of state
change sequences can then be handled as objects and attention
can be targeted at them, thus making them preconscious or
conscious.
Unconscious affects are then first-layer affects that cannot
be perceived by the second layer. This may be due to e.g. fixed
structural limitations in the introspection mechanism. Defined
this way we can also say that there may be affective agents
that are not emotional. In particular, all agents with one-layer
controlling system would be affective only. An affective agent
can thus be fully unconscious. However, an emotional or a
feeling agent needs consciousness.
D. Differentiating by object constellations
Classification presented here contains mostly the same
affects as the OCC model [1], but the classification criteria
differ. The classification is presented in figure 2, which may be
compared with the classification proposed in the OCC model
[1, p. 19].
4
A pre-print version; final version published in D. Dietrich et al. (Eds.): Simulating the Mind. Springer 2009.
http://www.springer.com/springerwiennewyork/computer+science/book/978-3-211-09450-1
The differentiation criteria are: nature of the target: whether
the target of affect is an event, or an object or agent; time:
whether the event has happened in the past or is expected
in the future; expectedness: whether the object was known or
unknown, or whether a past event was expected or unexpected;
goal correspondence: whether the event contributed positively
or negatively to agent’s goals; self-inflictedness: whether the
event was self-inflicted or caused by others; relation to the
target: whether the target object or agent of the event was
liked or disliked.
A simplified implementation of these criteria can be con-
structed as follows: agents do not form memories of events
as a whole, but only record utilities of causing objects. Future
expectations are thus implicit and consist of object utilities
only. In other words, agents do not expect specific events, but
expect a specific object to have an utility that is the average
of the previous events created by it. An object is expected,
if a model of it exists, i.e. it has been perceived before as a
causing object. Goal correspondence is implicit in the utilities,
as agents only have one goal: maximization of the utility. Goal
structure and goal derivatives are thus abstracted away in this
simplification.
E. Affects related to events
The first differentiation criteria for event-related affects are:
whether the event was targeted towards self or towards other;
and whether the originator of the event was self or other.
1) Events targeted towards self:
a) Unexpected past events: Fright is an affect caused
by a negative unexpected event. Correspondingly, delight is
an affect caused by a positive unexpected event. Surprise is
caused by a neutral unexpected event. Whether or not it is an
affect is often disputed. If it is associated with e.g. memory-
related physiological changes, it would be an affect. Another
criteria is, that it is associated with a typical facial expression;
in this sense it should be classified as an affect.
b) Expected future events: An expected positive future
event causes hope. Correspondingly, an expected negative
future event causes fear.
c) Expected past events: Relief is an affect caused by an
expected negative event not being realized. Disappointment
is an affect caused by an expected positive event not being
realized. Satisfaction is an affect caused by an expected
positive event being realized as expected. Fears-confirmed is
an affect caused by an expected negative event being realized
as expected.
2) Events targeted towards others:
a) Disliked objects: Envy is targeted towards a disliked
agent that experienced a positive event. Gloating is targeted
towards a disliked agent that experienced a negative event.
b) Liked objects: Pity is targeted towards a liked agent
that experienced a negative event. Happy-for is targeted to-
wards a liked agent that experienced a positive event.
3) Self-caused events: Remorse is targeted torwards a self-
originated action that caused a negative event to self or some-
one liked; events positive for disliked objects are considered
negative for self. Pride is targeted towards a self-originated
action that caused a positive event to self or a liked object;
events negative for disliked objects are considered positive for
self. Shame is targeted towards self when a self-originated
action caused a negative event.
4) Events caused by others: Gratitude is targeted towards
an agent that caused a positive event towards self or someone
who self depends on (i.e. likes). Correspondingly, anger is
targeted towards an agent that caused a negative event.
F. Affects related to agents and objects
In addition to event-related affects, also the originators and
targets of events are targets of affects.
1) Past consequences related affects: Consequences of
events cause the originators of the events to be liked or
disliked. Like and dislike can be thought of as aggregate terms,
taking into account all events caused by an agent. Dislike
or hate is targeted towards an agent, who has on average
produced more harm than good. Accordingly, like or love
is targeted towards an agent, who has produced more good
than harm. The difference between e.g. like and love is that
of magnitude, not of quality; i.e. love is ”stronger” liking. A
possibly more appropriate interpretation of love as altruism,
i.e. as prioritizing needs of others instead of own needs, is
currently out of scope of this model.
2) Future prospects related affects: Future prospects are
estimated on the basis of past experiences; therefore they are
determined by the past. However, if we set the point of view
on the future only, we can differentiate disgust from dislike
and like from desire. Desire is an affect caused by a positive
future expectation associated to an object. Accordingly, disgust
is an affect caused by a negative future expectation.
3) Identification-related affects: Identification-related af-
fects are currently out of the scope of the computational
implementation, as the concept of identification has not been
been implemented. Agent wants to identify with an object, that
has capabilities that would fulfill its needs; in other words,
if the object can perform actions that the agent would like
to learn. Admiration is defined as an affect targeted towards
an agent or object that the agent wants to identify with.
Accordingly, reproach is targeted towards an object that the
agent does not want to identify with.
4) Self-referencing concepts: Above concepts referred to
external objects or relations between objects. Affective con-
cepts can also refer to the object itself: e.g. mood refers to the
state of the agent itself. Examples of mood are happiness, sad-
ness, depression and mania. A simple definition of happiness
could be that the average utility of all events (or events in the
context) is above zero (below zero for sadness, respectively).
Depression could be defined as a condition where no known
objects have a positive utility.
G. Affects and time
Often mood is thought of as being somehow qualitatively
different from emotions. In this paper, the longer duration of
mood is thought to be simply a consequence of the stability of
the contents of the object model, which in turn depends on the
environment. If the environment does not affect the relevant
needs, the affective state does not change.
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Fig. 2. Affects in relation to each other.
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IV. DEMONSTRATION
A simple browser-based implementation is available at
http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/turkia/emotion/emotioneditor
. In this simulation the user provides events that change the affective
states of three agents.
An example run is as follows. Agent 1 gives agent 2 an utility of
1. Since in the beginning the agents don’t have models of each other,
this positive event is unexpected, and agent 2 is thus delighted. Also,
it now beings to expect a positive utility from agent 1, is begins to
like agent 1. In turn, agent 2 gives agent 1 an utility of 1; agent 1 is
similarly delighted.
Now, agent 3 gives agent 1 an utility of zero. Agent 1 is surpised,
and it’s attitude towards agent 3 is set to neutral. Agent 3 then gives an
utility of -1 to agent 2, who is frightened, and begins to dislike agent
3. Although agent 1 is an outsider in this event it reacts to it, since
it likes agent 2. Thus, agent 1 targets an affect of pity/compassion
towards agent 2 and anger towards agent 3.
Agent 2 now gives an utility of -2 to agent 3, who is frightened,
and begins to dislike agent 2. Agent 2 gloats over the misfortune of
agent 3 and feels pride of its own action. Agent 1 feels pity towards 3
and anger at 2 (due to neutral attitude being defined equal to liking).
Finally, agent 1 gives an utility of 2 to agent 3, who is delighted.
Agent 1 feels happy for agent 3 and pride for its own action. Agent
2 feels envy towards the disliked agent 3 and anger towards agent 1.
At this point, all agents have expectations of each other.
Agent 2 now accidentally gives an utility 2 to the disliked agent 3,
after which it feels remorse and anger towards self and envy towards
3. Agent 1 feels happy for 3 and gratitude towards 2.
At this point, agents don’t have utilities for themselves. To
demonstrate affects related to expected past events, agent 2 gives
itself an utility of 2. It is now delighted, likes itself, and expects a
similar result in the future. When performing the same event again,
agent 2 feels satisfaction and joy. However, now giving itself an utility
of 1, it is disappointed and feels remorse.
As a result of the previous event history, agent 3 expect an utility
of 2 and is in a good mood. It does not have expectations of itself.
When giving itself an utility of -4, its average expectations change
to -2, its expectations towards itself to -4 and its mood to bad. When
giving itself an utility of -4 again, its fears are confirmed. When
giving itself an utility of -2, it feels relief.
The event sequence was thus (1,2,1), (2,1,1), (3,1,0), (3,2,-1), (2,3,-
2), (1,3,2), (2,3,2), (2,2,2), (2,2,2), (2,2,1), (3,3,-4), (3,3,-4), (3,3,-
2), where the first argument of the triple is the causing agent, the
second is the target agent, and the third is the utility of the event.
As mentioned before, the resulting intersubjective utility expectations
form a network of object relations.
V. CONCLUSION
This article presented definitions of affects, that remove the
limitations of the OCC model and are easily computationally im-
plementable. They can be used as a starting point in the development
of computational psychological, psychiatric, sociological and crimi-
nological theories, or in e.g. computer games.
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